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1. Introduction
According to car crash statistics, over sixmillionmotor vehicle crashes occur onU.S. highways
each year. More than 42,000 people are killed in these accidents which injure three million
others, and cost more than $230 billion each year. Astonishingly, five people die every hour
in these crashes in the United States which is about one death every 12 minutes IVI (2001).
In order to alleviate the threats of these crashes and improve the driving experience, car
manufactures and the telecommunication industry have made great efforts to equip each
vehicle with wireless devices that allow vehicles to communicate with each other as well as
with the roadside infrastructure located in critical points of the road, such as intersections
or construction sites. Misener (2005); VII (2011). Technologies built on 802.11p and IEEE
1609 standards, 5.9 GHz Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) protocols 1 DSRC
(1999), are proposed to support these advanced vehicle safety applications such as secure
and effective vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) (also known as Inter-Vehicle Communica- tion (IVC))
and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications, which are also known as Vehicle Safety
Communications (VSC) technologies. As shown in Fig. 1, the wireless communication
devices installed on vehicles, also known as onboard units (OBUs), and the roadside units
(RSUs), form a self-organized Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) Lin (2008); Sun (2007).
Furthermore, the RSUs are connected to the backbone network via the high speed network
connections. In this way, VANETs inherently provide a way to collect traffic and road
information from vehicles, and to deliver road services including warnings and traffic
information to users in the vehicles. Thus, an increasing interest has been raised recently on
the VANETs-based applications Bishop (2000), aiming to improve driving safety and traffic
management by the method of providing drivers and passengers with Internet access.
Due to the open broadcasting of wireless communications and the high-speed mobility of
the vehicles, extensive research efforts have been launched by academic institutions and
industrial research labs several years ago to investigate key issues in VANETs, especially
1 The United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has allocated in the USA 75MHz
of spectrum in the 5.9GHz band for DSRC and the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) has allocated in the Europe 30 MHz of spectrum in the 5.9GHz band for Intelligent
Transportation Systems in October 1999 and August 2008, respectively
3
www.intechopen.com
2 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
security and privacy preservation for mobile vehicles Calandriello et al. (2007); Chen et al.
(2011); Daza et al. (2009); Hubaux et al. (2004); Kamat et al. (2006); Kounga et al. (2009); Li et al.
(2008); Lin et al. (2007; 2008a;b); Lu et al. (2008; 2009; 2010); Mak et al. (2005); Plöβl & Federrath
(2008); Raya & Hubaux (2005; 2007); Sun et al. (2007; 2010a;b); Wasef et al. (2010); Wang et al.
(2008); Wu et al. (2010); Xu et al. (2007); Xi et al. (2007; 2008); Xiong et al. (2010a;b); Zhang et
al. (2008a;b). Obviously, any malicious behaviors of user, such as injecting beacons with false
information, modifying and replaying the previously disseminated messages, could be fatal
to the other users. Thus, identifying the message issuer is mandatory to reduce the risk of
such attacks. Meanwhile, in order to protect the user-related private information, such as
the driver’s name, the license plate, speed, position, and travelling routes along with their
relationship, authentication in VANETs should be privacy-preserving.
It is natural to observe that achieving privacy and liability simultaneously is conflicting
goal. On one aspect, a well-meaning OBU is willing to offer as much local information
as possible to RSUs and other OBUs to create a safer driving environment so long as its
locations cannot be tracked. And on the other, a misbehaving OBU may abuse the privacy
protection mechanism to avoid legal responsibility when it involved in a dispute involving
safety messages 2attempts. Therefore, the conditional privacy-preserving authentication should
be fulfilled in VANETs where a trusted authority can reveal the real identity of targeted OBU
in case of a traffic event dispute, even though the OBU itself is not traceable by the public.
This chapter surveys the literature on privacy issues in VANETs from different perspectives,
and thus provides researchers with a better understanding of this primitive. This chapter does
not propose or advocate any specific anonymous authentication mechanisms. Even though
some sections might point out vulnerabilities in certain classes of authentication protocols,
our purpose is not to criticize, but to draw attention to these problems so that they might be
solved.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents attack model, security
requirements and related VANETs network architecture. All previous privacy-preserving
protocols for VANETs are classified in Section 3, together with the basic cryptographic
primitives. An example of Ring-signature based anonymous authentication protocol based
on bilinear pairing are given in Section 4. Section 5 discusses how to use the taxonomies.
Section 6 concludes the paper by stating some possible future research directions.
2. Motivation
2.1 Attack model
According to Lin (2008); Lin et al. (2007); Raya & Hubaux (2005; 2007); Sun et al. (2007), several
possible security attacks in VANETs have been defined and listed as follows:
• Fake information attack: The adversary may diffuse bogus messages to affect the behavior
of others. For instance, in order to divert traffic from a given road, one may send a fake
traffic jam message to the others.
• Message replay attack: The adversary replays the valid messages sent by a legitimate user
some time before in order to disturb the traffic.
2 A safety message reports on the state of the sender vehicle, e.g., its location, speed, heading, etc.
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Fig. 1. Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
• Message modification attack: A message is altered during or after transmission. The
adversary may wish to change the source or content of the message in terms of the position
and/or time information that had been sent and saved in its device notably in the case of
an accident.
• Impersonation attack: The adversary may pretend to be another vehicle or even an RSU
by using false identities to fool the others.
• RSU preemption/replication attack: An RSUmay be compromised such that the adversary
can relocate the compromised RSU to launch any malicious attack, such as broadcasting
fake traffic information. Moreover, the adversary may illegally interrupt and manipulate
traffic lights which is controlled by the corrupted RSU to get a better traffic condition
• Denial of service (DoS) attack: The adversary injects irrelevant jamming and aggressive
dummy messages to take up the channels and consume the computational resources of
the other nodes, such as RF interference or jamming or layer 2 packet flooding.
• Movement tracking: Since wireless communication is on an openly shared medium, an
adversary can easily eavesdrop on any traffic. After the adversary intercepts a significant
amount of messages in a certain region, the adversary may trace a vehicle in terms of its
physical position and moving patterns simply through information analysis. Assuming
that the attacker does not make use of cameras, physical pursuit, or onboard tracking
devices to reveal the identity of his target; otherwise, the tracking problem becomes
simpler but also more expensive and limited to few specific targets.
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2.2 Security requirements
To countermeasure and mitigate the potential threats in the aforementioned attack models, a
security system for safety messaging in a VANET should satisfy the following requirements.
1. Efficient anonymous authentication of safety messages: The security system should provide
an efficient and anonymous message authentication mechanism. First of all, all accepted
messages should be delivered unaltered, and the origin of the messages should be
authenticated to guard against impersonation attacks. Meanwhile, from the point of
vehicle owners, it may not be acceptable to leak personal information, including identity
and location, to unauthorized observers while authenticating messages. Therefore,
providing a secure yet anonymous message authentication is critical to the applicability
of VANETs. Furthermore, considering the limited storage and computation resource
of OBUs, the authentication scheme should have low overheads for safety message
verification and storage.
2. Efficient tracking of the source of a disputed safety message: An important and challenging issue
in these conditions is enabling a trusted third party (such as police officers) to retrieve a
vehicle’s real identity from its pseudo identity. If this feature is not provided, anonymous
authentication can only prevent an outside attack, but cannot deal with an inside one.
Furthermore, the system should not only provide safety message traceability to prevent
inside attacks, but also have reasonable overheads for the revealing the identity of a
message sender.
3. Threshold authentication Chen et al. (2011); Daza et al. (2009); Kounga et al. (2009); Wu et al.
(2010): A message is viewed as trustworthy only after it has been endorsed by at least n
vehicles, where n is a threshold. The threshold mechanism is a priori countermeasure that
improves the confidence of other vehicles in a message. In addition, the threshold in the
proposed scheme should be adaptive, that is to say, the sender can dynamically change the
threshold according to the traffic context and scenarios.
4. ConfidentialityKamat et al. (2006); Li et al. (2008); Plöβl & Federrath (2008); Wang et al. (2008)
Some research teams pointed out that the privacy of the communication content should
be protected against unauthorized observers. While confidentiality of communicating
message can be negligible in most cases, it is e.g. crucial for services subject to costs.
Besides application data administrative messages like routing protocol information or
messages containing cryptographic material, the cryptographic information held by
participants or centralized instances should also be protected against unauthorized access.
2.3 Network model
Similar to previouswork Calandriello et al. (2007); Chen et al. (2011); Daza et al. (2009); Hubaux
et al. (2004); Kamat et al. (2006); Kounga et al. (2009); Li et al. (2008); Lin et al. (2007; 2008a;b);
Lu et al. (2008; 2009; 2010); Mak et al. (2005); Plöβl & Federrath (2008); Raya & Hubaux (2005;
2007); Sun et al. (2007; 2010a;b); Wasef et al. (2010); Wang et al. (2008); Wu et al. (2010); Xu et al.
(2007); Xi et al. (2007; 2008); Xiong et al. (2010a;b); Zhang et al. (2008a;b), the security system
should include at least three types of entities: the top Trusted authority (TA), the immobile
RSUs at the roadside, and the moving vehicles equipped with on-board units (OBUs).
• OBU: A vehicle can not join the VANETs unless it registers its own public system
parameters and corresponding private key to the TA. The secret information such as
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private keys to be used generates the need for a tamper-proof device in each vehicle.
According to existing works, only the authorized parties can access to this tamper-proof
device. OBUs are mobile and moving most of the time. When the OBUs are on the road,
they regularly broadcast routine safety messages, such as position, current time, direction,
speed, traffic conditions, traffic events. The information system on each vehicle aggregates
and diffuses these messages to enable drivers form a better awareness of their environment
(Fig. 2). The assumed communication protocol between neighboring OBUs (IVC) or
between an OBU and a RSU (V2I) is 5.9 GHz Dedicated Short Range Communication
(DSRC) DSRC (1999) IEEE 802.11p.
• RSU: The RSUs, which are subordinated by the TA, form a wireless multi-hop mesh
network (mesh mode in WiMax) aiming to extend the wireless coverage and increase the
network robustness and throughput. Some of these RSUs are connected to the backbone
networks with wired connections or to the WiMax base stations with wireless connections.
Vehicles and passengers can gain access to the Internet for a short moment when passing
through any of the RSUs by communicating with it. Thus, the RSUs should be able
to perform fast handoff in order to support basic Internet services such as e-mail and
TCP applications. We remark that the handoff process should be predictive when the
moving pattern and speed of the vehicle are given. In addition, the RSUs should work as
gateways which also support the 802.11p protocol and can transform the safety messages
broadcasted by the vehicles into IP packets. With the support from RSUs, the workload
of the vehicles is reduced. Otherwise, the vehicles need to send multiple copies of safety
messages in different formats: one to the other vehicles with 802.11p, and one to the base
stations with 802.16e. Different from the vehicles, we assume that RSUs have neither
computation and energy constraints nor buffer size constraints.
• TA: The TA is in charge of the registration of all RSUs and OBUs each vehicle is equipped
with. The TA can reveal the real identity of a safety message sender by incorporating
with its subordinate RSUs. To the end, the TA requires ample computation and storage
capability, and the TA cannot be compromised and is fully trusted by all parties in the
system.
The network dynamics are characterized by quasi-permanent mobility, high speed, and (in
most cases) short connection times between neighboring vehicles or between a vehicle and a
roadside infrastructure network access point.
3. Taxonomy of privacy-preserving authentication protocol for VANETs
3.1 RSU-based approach
Zhang et al.Zhang et al. (2008a;b) presented a novel RSU-aided message authentication
scheme (RSUB), in which the RSUs are responsible for validating the authenticity of messages
sent from vehicles and for sending the results back to peer vehicles. Compared to the
solutions without support from RSUs, this kind of schemes enables lower computation and
communication overheads for each vehicle. Independently, Lu et al. Lu et al. (2008) introduced
another anonymous authentication protocol for VANETs based on generating on-the-fly
short-lived anonymous keys for the communication between vehicles and RSUs. These keys
enable fast anonymous authentication and conditional privacy. All of these schemes employ
RSUs to assist vehicles in authenticating messages. To keep a centralized certificate issuer from
57nonymous Authentication P otocols for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: An Overview
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Fig. 2. VANETs Architecture
being a bottleneck, an RSU is allowed to issue certificates for the vehicles. However, it brings a
privacy risk when an RSU is compromised by the adversaries. Once the service records of an
RSU are leaked, it is easy for the adversary to link the pseudonymous certificates that a vehicle
has obtained from the compromised RSU. In particular, when the number of compromised
RSUs increases, it possibly provides a solution for the adversaries to revert the mobile trace
of the target vehicles. However, relying on the roadside infrastructure for safety message
authentication is a precarious solution: while these messages enable critical assisted driving
features the roadside infrastructure will likely offer only partial coverage (for example during
the deployment stage, for economic considerations, or simply due to physical damage).
3.2 Group-oriented signature-based approach
3.2.1 Group signature-based scheme
In Chaum & Hevst (1991), Chaum and Heyst proposed a new type of signature scheme for a
group of entities, called group signatures. Such a scheme allows a group member to sign a
message on the group’s behalf such that everybody can verify the signature but no one can
find out which group member provided it. However, there is a trusted third party, called
the group manager, who can reveal the identity of the originator of a signature in the case
of later dispute. This act is referred to as “opening" a signature or also as revocation of a
signer’s anonymity. The groupmanager can either be a single entity or a number of coalitions
of several entities (e.g., group members). Dozens of group signature schemes Boneh et al.
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(2004); Boneh & Shacham (2004); Chaum & Hevst (1991); Nakanishi & Funabiki (2005) have
been proposed since 1991 due to its attractive features.
Lin et al. Lin et al. (2007; 2008a); Sun et al. (2007) proposed the group signature based (GSB)
protocol, based on the efficient group signature Boneh et al. (2004). With GSB, each vehicle
stores only a private key and a group public key. Messages are signed using the group
signature scheme without revealing any identity information to the public. Thus privacy is
preserved while the trusted authority is able to expose the identity of a sender. However, the
time for safety message verification grows linearly with the number of revoked vehicles in
the revocation list in the entire network. Hence, each vehicle has to spend additional time
on safety message verification. Furthermore, when the number of revoked vehicles in the
revocation list is larger than some threshold, the protocol requires every remaining vehicle
to calculate a new private key and group public key based on the exhaustive list of revoked
vehicles whenever a vehicle is revoked. Lin et al. Lin et al. (2007; 2008a); Sun et al. (2007)
do not explore solutions to effectively updated the system parameters for the participating to
vehicles in a timely, reliable and scalable fashion. This issue is not explored and represents an
important obstacle to the success of this scheme.
3.2.2 Ring signature-based scheme
Ring signature scheme, introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman Rivest et al. (2001), offers
two main properties: anonymity and spontaneity. In practice, anonymity in a ring signature
means 1-out-of-n signer verifiability, which enables the signer to keep anonymous in these
“rings" of diverse signers. Spontaneity is a property which makes the distinction between
ring signatures and group signatures Boneh et al. (2004); Chaum & Hevst (1991). Different
from group signatures which allow the anonymity of a real signer in a group can be revoked
by a group manager, the ring signature only gives the group manager the absolute power to
control the formation of the group, and does not allow anyone to revoke the signer anonymity,
while allowing the real signer to form a ring arbitrarily without being controlled by any other
party. Since Rivest el al.’s scheme, many ring signature schemes have been proposed Abe et
al. (2002); Bresson et al. (2002); Dodis et al. (2004); Wong et al. (2003); Xiong et al. (2009; 2011).
In 2007, Liu et al. Liu et al. (2007) have introduced a new variant for the ring signature, called
revocable ring signature. This scheme allows a real signer to form a ring arbitrarily while
allowing a set of authorities to revoke the anonymity of the real signer. In other words, the
real signerwill be responsible for what has signed as the anonymity is revocable by authorities
while the real signer still has full freedom on ring formation.
To address the scalability concern in Lin et al. (2007), Xiong et al. Xiong et al. (2010a) proposed
a spontaneous protocol based on the revocable ring signature Liu et al. (2007), which allows
the vehicle to generate the message without requiring online assistance from the RSUs or
the other vehicles. In this solution, the remaining vehicles are not required to update their
system parameters regardless of the number of revoked vehicles. However, this protocol
suffers larger communication overhead than that of other protocols because the length of ring
signature depends on the size of the ring. Furthermore, Xi et al. Xi et al. (2007; 2008) also
introduced a random key-set-based authentication protocol to preserve the vehicle’s privacy
based on ring signature. However, this solution only provides unconditional anonymity
without an effective and efficient mechanism to reveal message sender’s identities when
necessary.
59nonymous Authentication P otocols for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: An Overview
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3.2.3 k-TAA-based scheme
In a k-times anonymous authentication (k-TAA) system Teranisi et al. (2004), participants are a
group manager (GM), a number of application providers (AP) and a group of users. The GM
registers users into the group and each AP independently announces the number of times
a user can access his application. A registered user can then be anonymously authenticated
by APs within their allowed numbers of times (k times) and without the need to contact the
GM. Dishonest users can be traced by anyone while no one, even the GM or APs, can identify
honest users or link two authentication executions performed by the same user. Finally no
one, even the GM, is able to successfully impersonate an honest user to an AP. In dynamic
k-TAA Nguyen & Safavi-Naini (2005), APs have more control over granting and revoking
access to their services and so have the required control on their clients.
Sun et al. Sun & Fang (2009); Sun et al. (2010c) proposed a newmisbehavior defense technique
leveraging the idea of dynamic revocation, to provide a means of limiting the impact of
misbehavior by adjusting it to an acceptable level during the vulnerable period existing in
the automatic revocation technique based on dynamic k-TAA. However, the downside of Sun
et al.’s scheme is obviously the lack of capability to trace misbehaving users.
3.3 Pseudonyms-based approach
3.3.1 Basic scheme
Raya et al.Raya & Hubaux (2005; 2007) introduced the large number of anonymous key based
(LAB) protocol. Their key idea is to install on each OBU a large number of private keys
and their corresponding anonymous certificates. To sign each launched message, a vehicle
randomly selects one of its anonymous certificates and uses its corresponding private key.
The other vehicles use the public key of the sender enclosed with the anonymous certificate
to authenticate the source of the message. These anonymous certificates are generated by
employing the pseudo-identity of the vehicles, instead of taking any real identity information
of the drivers. Each certificate has a short life time to meet the drivers’privacy requirement.
Although LAB protocol can effectively meet the conditional privacy requirement, it is
inefficient and may become a scalability bottleneck. The reason is that a sufficient numbers of
certificates must be issued to each vehicle to maintain anonymity over a significant period of
time. (Raya et al.Raya & Hubaux (2005; 2007) suggest using large pseudo certificates for each
vehicle). As a result, the certificate database to be searched by the TRC in order to match a
compromised certificate to its owner’s identity is huge. In addition, the protocols of Raya
& Hubaux (2007) are extended for providing confidentiality in specific scenarios of VANET
implementations in Wang et al. (2008).
3.3.2 TESLA-based scheme
TESLA is an efficient andmessage-loss tolerant protocol for broadcast authentication with low
communication and computation overhead Perrig et al. (2002a). It is widely used in areas of
sensor networks Perrig et al. (2002b). It uses one-way hash chain where the chain elements are
the secret keys to compute message authentication code (MAC). With TESLA, a sender sends
data packets at a predefined schedule, which has been known in advance to the receivers as
well as the commitment to a hash chain as a key commitment. Each hash chain element as
a MAC key corresponds to a certain time interval. For each packet, the sender attaches a
60 Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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MAC tag to it. This MAC tag is derived using the next corresponding MAC key in the hash
chain based on negotiated key disclosure delay schedule between the sender and the receiver.
Obviously, upon receiving the packet, the receiver cana˛r´t verify the authenticity of the packet
yet. After key disclosure delay, the sender discloses MAC key, and then the receiver is able to
authenticate the message after verifying the released MAC key is indeed the corresponding
element of the chain. One requirement for TESLA scheme is the loose synchronization among
the nodes. The disadvantage is the delayed message authentication.
Lin et al. Lin et al. (2008b) developed the ‘time-efficient and secure vehicular communication’
scheme (TSVC) based on the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA)
standard (RFC 4082) Perrig et al. (2002a). With TSVC, a vehicle first broadcasts a commitment
of hash chain to its neighbors and then uses the elements of the hash chain to generate
a message authentication code (MAC) with which other neighbors can authenticate this
vehicles’ following messages. Because of the fast speed of MAC verification, the computation
overhead of TSVC is reduced significantly. However, TSVC also requires a huge set of
anonymous public/private key pairs as well as their corresponding public key certificates
to be preloaded in each vehicle. Furthermore, TSVC may not be robust when the traffic
becomes extremely dynamic as a vehicle should broadcast its key chain commitment much
more frequently.
3.3.3 Proxy re-signature-based scheme
Proxy re-signature schemes, introduced by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss Blaze et al. (1998),
and formalized later by Ateniese and Hohenberger Ateniese & Hohenberger (2005), allow
a semi-trusted proxy to transform a delegateea˛r´s signature into a delegatora˛r´s signature on
the same message by using some additional information. Proxy re-signature can be used to
implement anonymizable signatures in which outgoing messages are first signed by specific
users. Before releasing them to the outside world, a proxy translates signatures into ones
that verify under a system’s public key so as to conceal the original issuer’s identity and the
internal structure of the organization. Recently, Libert et al. Libert & Vergnaud (2008) have
introduced the first multi-hop unidirectional proxy re-signature scheme wherein the proxy can
only translate signatures in one direction and messages can be resigned a polynomial number
of times.
The size of the certificate revocation list (CRL) and the checking cost are two important
performance metrics for the revocation mechanism in VANETs. Unfortunately, the
pseudonymous authentication schemes are prone to generating a huge CRL, whereas the
checking cost in the group-signature-based schemes is unacceptable for the vehicles with
limited computation power. Since the CRL is usually transmitted by vehicle-to-vehicle
communication, the quick increase of the CRL in the pseudonymous authentication schemes
brings large communication cost. Moreover, the larger the CRL size, the longer the
transmission delay to all vehicles, and during this period, the misbehaving vehicles can
compromise VANETs continually. Sun et al. Sun et al. (2010a;b) proposed an efficient
authentication protocol which supports RSU-aided distribution certificate service that allows
a vehicle to update its certificate set from an RSU on the road based on the proxy re-signature
Libert & Vergnaud (2008). In their scheme, the vehicle only needs to request the re-signature
keys from an RSU and re-sign numbers of the certificates issued by the TA to be the same
as those issued by the RSU itself, and thus significantly reduces the revocation cost and the
61nonymous Authentication P otocols for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: An Overview
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certificate updating overhead. However, their scheme also rely on the RSUs which only cover
partial high-way or city roads during the deployment stage.
3.3.4 Confidentiality-oriented scheme
The need for confidentiality in specific scenarios of VANET implementations has also been
discussed in recent works Kamat et al. (2006); Li et al. (2008); Plöβl & Federrath (2008); Wang
et al. (2008). Specifically in Wang et al. (2008), the protocols of Raya & Hubaux (2007) are
extended: session keys for pairs of vehicles are established by using the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement protocol while group session keys are established using the key transfer
approach. These keys are used for both message authentication and confidentiality Wang et al.
(2008). A lightweight authenticated key establishment scheme with privacy preservation and
confidentiality to secure the communications in VANET is proposed by Li et al. Li et al. (2008).
Meantime, two security frameworks for VANETs to provide authentication, confidentiality,
non-repudiation and message integrity have also been proposed by Plöβl & Federrath (2008)
and Kamat et al. (2006) independently. Nevertheless, all of these works Kamat et al. (2006);
Li et al. (2008); Plöβl & Federrath (2008); Wang et al. (2008) suffer from the same criticism in
LAB, in other words, each OBU has to take a large storage space to store a huge number of
anonymous key pairs.
3.4 Priori-based approach
By taking strict punitive action, a posteriori countermeasures can exclude some rational
attackers, but they are ineffective against irrational attackers such as terrorists. Even for
rational attackers, damage has already occurred when punitive action is taken. To reduce
the damage to a bare minimum, the priori countermeasures have been proposed to prevent
the generation of fake messages. In this approach, a message is not considered valid unless it
has been endorsed by a number of vehicles above a certain threshold.
3.4.1 Basic scheme
Most recently, Kounga et al. Kounga et al. (2009) proposed a solution that permits vehicles
to verify the reliability of information received from anonymous origins. In this solution,
each vehicle can generate the public/private key pairs by itself. However, the assumption in
this solution is very restricted in that additional hardware is needed on the OBU. However,
Chen and Ng Chen & Ng (2010) showd that the Kounga et al.’s scheme does not achieve the
goals of authenticity of a message, privacy of drivers and vehicles, reliability of distributed
information, and revocation of illegitimate vehicles.
After that, a proposal is also presented following the priori protection paradigm based on
threshold signature by Daza et al. Daza et al. (2009). Nevertheless, to obtain the anonymity,
this protocol assumes that the OBU installed on the vehicle can be removable and multi OBUs
could alternatively be used with the same vehicle (like several cards can be used within a cell
phone in the same time). Thus, this assumption may enable malicious adversary to mount
the so-called Sybil attack: vehicles using different anonymous key pairs from corresponding
OBUs can sign multiple messages to pretend that these messages were sent by different
vehicles. Since multi OBUs can be installed on the same vehicle, no one can find out whether
all of these signatures come from the same vehicle or not.
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Anonymous Traceability Confidentiality GSBS RSUS Priori PBS
authentication -based
Zhang et al. (2008a;b)   
Lu et al. (2008)   
Lin et al. (2007; 2008a)   
Sun et al. (2007)   
Xiong et al. (2010a)   
Xi et al. (2007; 2008)  
Sun & Fang (2009)  
Sun et al. (2010c)  
Raya & Hubaux (2005; 2007)   
Lin et al. (2008b)   
Sun et al. (2010a;b)    
Li et al. (2008)    
Plöβl & Federrath (2008)    
Kamat et al. (2006)    
Wang et al. (2008)    
Kounga et al. (2009)3 
Daza et al. (2009)   
Wu et al. (2010)    
GSBS: Group-oriented signature based scheme; RSUS: RSU based scheme; PBS:
Pseudonyms-based scheme
Table 1. Summary of related protocols
3.4.2 Group signature-based scheme
A linkable group signatureNakanishi et al. (1999) is a variant of group signatures. In a linkable
group signature, it is easy to distinguish the group signatures produced by the same signer,
even though the signer is anonymous. Linkable group signatures can thwart the Sybil attack
but are not compatible with vehicle privacy due to the linkability of signer identities, i.e., the
various message endorsements signed by a certain vehicle can be linked. Wu et al. Wu et al.
(2010) proposed a novel protocol based on linkable group signature, which is equipped with
both priori and posteriori countermeasures. However, they face the same adverse conditions
in GSB protocol in which the verification time grows linearly with the number of revoked
vehicles and every remaining vehicle need to update its private key and group public key
when the number of revoked vehicles is larger than some threshold.
4. An example of ring-signature based anonymous authentication protocols
In order to be self-contained, we give an example of Ring-signature based authentication
protocol along with the notion of bilinear pairing Xiong et al. (2010a) as follows.
4.1 Bilinear pairing
Note that the publication of an identity based encryption scheme Boneh & Franklin (2001)
built on bilinear pairings has triggered a real upsurge in the popularity of pairings among
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cryptographers. Following Boneh and Franklin, a lot of cryptosystems based on pairings
have been proposedwhichwould be hard to construct usingmore conventional cryptographic
primitives. At this moment, pairing-based cryptography is a highly active field of research,
with several hundreds of publications.
Let G1 denote an additive group of prime order q and G2 be a multiplicative group of the
same order. Let P be a generator of G1, and eˆ be a bilinear map such that eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2
with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: For all P,Q ∈ G1, and a, b ∈ Zq, eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)
ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: eˆ(P, P) = 1G2
3. Computability: It is efficient to compute eˆ(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1
4.2 Ring-signature based
4.2.1 System initialization
Firstly, as described in section 2.3, we assume each vehicle is equipped with a tamper-proof
device, which is secure against any compromise attempt in any circumstance. With the
tamper-proof device on vehicles, an adversary cannot extract any data stored in the device
including key material, data, and codes. We assume that there is a trusted Transportation
Regulation Center (TRC) which is in charge of checking the vehicle’s identity, and generating
and pre-distributing the private keys of the vehicles. Prior to the network deployment, the
TRC sets up the system parameters for each OBU as follows:
• Let G1, G2 be two cyclic groups of same order q. Let eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear map.
• The TRC first randomly chooses xTRC ∈R Zq as its private key, and computes yTRC =
xTRCP as its public key. The TRC also chooses a secure cryptographic hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → Zq.
• Each vehicle Vi with real identity RIDi generates its public/private key pair as follows:
– The vehicle Vi first chooses xi ∈R Zq as its private key, and computes yi = xiP as its
public key.
– Vi randomly selects an integer ti ∈R Zq to determine the verification information of yi:
ai = H(tiP ‖ RIDi) and bi = (ti + xi · ai). Then Vi sends {yi,RIDi, ai, bi} to TRC.
– After receiving {yi,RIDi, ai, bi}, TRC checks whether the following equation holds:
ai
?
= H((biP− aiyi) ‖ RIDi)
If it holds, then {yi,RIDi} is identified as the valid public key and identity. Otherwise,
it will be rejected. In the end, the TRC stores the (yi,RIDi) in its records.
• Each vehicle is preloadedwith the public parameters {G1,G2, q, yTRC,H}. In addition, the
tamper-proof device of each vehicle is preloaded with its private/public key pairs (xi, yi)
and corresponding anonymous certificates (these certificates are generated by taking the
vehicle’s pseudo-identity IDi). Finally, the vehicle will preload the revocation list (RL)
from the TRC.
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4.2.2 OBU safety message generation
Vehicle Vπ signs the message M before sending it out. Suppose S = {y1, · · · , yn} is the set of
public keys collected by vehicle Vπ and it defines the ring of unrevoked public keys. Note that
the public key set S, collected and stored temporarily by Vπ , is dynamic. We assume that all
public keys yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and their corresponding private keys xi’s are generated by TRC, and
π (1 ≤ π ≤ n) is the index of the actual message sender. In other words, as Vπ travels through
the road network, the set of public keys collected by it keeps changing over time. Otherwise,
a unique set of public keys used by a vehicle may enable the adversary to infer its traveling
trajectory. The signature generation algorithm Sig(S, xπ , yTRC,M) is carried out as follows.
1. Randomly select r ∈R Zq and compute R = rP.
2. For yTRC, compute ETRC = eˆ(yπ , yTRC)
r.
3. Generate a non-interactive proof SPK(1) as follows: SPK{α : {ETRC = eˆ(R, yTRC)
α}
∧
{∨
i∈[1,n]
yi = αP}}(M). The signature σ of M with respect to S and yTRC is (R, ETRC) and the
transcript of SPK(1).
For clear presentation, we divide SPK(1) into two components:
SPK{α : ETRC = eˆ(R, yTRC)
α}(M), (1a)
SPK{α :
∨
i∈[1,n]
yi = αP}(M). (1b)
To generate a transcript of SPK(1a), given ETRC,R, yTRC, the actual message sender indexed
by π proves the knowledge of xπ such that ETRC = eˆ(R, yTRC)
xπ by releasing (s, c) as the
transcript such that
c = H(yTRC ‖ R ‖ ETRC ‖ eˆ(R, yTRC)
sEcTRC ‖ M)
This can be done by randomly picking l ∈R Zq and computing
c = H(yTRC ‖ R ‖ ETRC ‖ eˆ(R, yTRC)
l ‖ M)
and then setting s = l − cxπ mod q.
To generate the transcript of SPK(1b), given S, the actual message sender indexed by π,
for some 1 ≤ π ≤ n, proves the knowledge of xπ out of n discrete logarithms xi, where
yi = xiP, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, without revealing the value of π. This can be done by releasing
(s1, · · · , sn, c1, · · · , cn) as the transcript such that c0 = ∑
n
i=1 ci mod q and
c0 = H(S ‖ s1P+ c1y1 ‖ · · · ‖ snP+ cnyn ‖ M).
To generate this transcript, the actual message sender first picks randomly l ∈R Zq and
si, ci ∈R Zq for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i = π, then computes
c0 = H(S ‖ s1P + c1y1 ‖ · · · ‖ sπ−1P + cπ−1yπ−1 ‖ lP ‖ sπ+1P + cπ+1yπ+1 ‖ · · · ‖
snP+ cnyn ‖ M)
65nonymous Authentication P otocols for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: An Overview
www.intechopen.com
14 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
Payload Timestamp Signature Public Key Sets
100 bytes 4 bytes 40n+60 bytes 20n bytes
Table 2. Message Format for OBU
and finds cπ such that c0 = c1 + · · ·+ cn mod q. Finally the actual message sender sets sπ =
l − cπxπ mod q.
Now we combine the constructions of SPK(1a) and SPK(1b) together. First, the actual
message sender randomly picks l1, l2 ∈R Zq and si, ci ∈R Zq for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i = π, then
computes
c = H(S ‖ yTRC ‖ R ‖ ETRC ‖ eˆ(R, yTRC)
l1 ‖ s1P+ c1y1 ‖ · · · ‖ sπ−1P+ cπ−1yπ−1 ‖ l2P ‖
sπ+1P+ cπ+1yπ+1 ‖ · · · ‖ snP+ cnyn ‖ M).
After that, the actual message sender sets s = l1 − cxπ mod q, finds cπ such that c =
c1 + · · · + cn mod q, and sets sπ = l2 − cπxπ mod q. The transcript of SPK(1) is therefore
(s, s1, · · · , sn, c1,
· · · , cn).
According to DoT (2006), the payload of a safety message is 100 bytes. The first two fields
are signed by the vehicle, by which the “signature" field can be derived. A timestamp is used
to prevent the message replay attack. The last field is the public key sets, which records the
public key pairs employed by the OBU. The format of messages in our protocol is defined in
Table 2.
4.2.3 Message verification
Once a message is received, the receiving vehicle first checks if the RL
⋂
S
?
= ∅. If so, the
receiver performs signature verification by verifying of SPK(1) as follows:
n
∑
i=1
ci
?
= H(S ‖ yTRC ‖ R ‖ ETRC ‖ eˆ(R, yTRC)
sE∑
n
i=1 ci
TRC ‖ s1P+ c1y1 ‖ · · · ‖ snP+ cnyn ‖
After that, the receiving vehicle updates its own public key set by randomly choosing public
keys from S.
4.2.4 OBU fast tracing
A membership tracing operation is performed when solving a dispute, where the real ID of
the signature generator is desired. The TRC first checks the validity of the signature and then
uses its private key xTRC and determines if
ETRC
?
= eˆ(yi, R)
xTRC
for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
If the equation holds at, say when i = π, then the TRC looks up the record (yπ, RIDπ) to
find the corresponding identity RIDπ meaning that vehicle with identity RIDπ is the actual
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message generator. The TRC then broadcasts the (yπ ,RIDπ) to all OBUs and each OBU adds
the yπ into his local revocation list (RL).
4.2.5 Message verification
Once a message is received, the receiving vehicle Vj, one of the group GGNO, uses his group’s
shared secret key κGNO to do the following with ciphertext (C1,C2):
1. Recover the session key ks ← b1/(b0)
κGNO .
2. Decrypt Dks(C2) = M‖σ‖GNOwith the session key ks, where Dks(·) denotes a symmetric
decryption with key ks and σ = (c, s1, s2, s3, s4, T1, T2, T3).
3. Check whether c ∈ {0, 1}k, and s1 ∈R ±{0, 1}
ǫ(γ2+k)+1, s2 ∈R ±{0, 1}
ǫ(λ2+k)+1, s3 ∈R
±{0, 1}ǫ(λ1+2lp+k+1)+1, and s4 ∈R ±{0, 1}
ǫ(2lp+k)+1 and T1, T2, T3 ∈ Zn.
4. Accept the signature if and only if c = H(g‖h‖y‖a0‖a‖T1‖T2‖T3‖d
′
1‖d
′
2‖d
′
3‖d
′
4‖M‖C1)
where d′1, d
′
2, d
′
3, d
′
4 are computed by the following equations: d
′
1 = a
c
0T
s1−c2γ1
1 /(a
s2−c2
λ1 ys3)
mod n, d′2 = T
s1−c2
γ1
2 /g
s3 mod n, d′3 = T
c
2g
s4 mod n, d′4 = T
c
3g
s1−c2γ1 hs4 mod n.
4.2.6 OBU fast tracing
A membership tracing operation is performed when solving a dispute, where the real IDi of
the signature generator is desired. The MM first decrypts (T1, T2) in a decrypted C2 message
to find the membership certificate Ai as follows:
1. Recover Ai = T1/T
x
2 .
2. Prove that loggy = logT2(T1/Ai mod n).
Then the MM looks up the record (Ai, IDi) to find the corresponding identity IDi meaning
that vehicle with identity IDi is the actual message generator. The MM then broadcasts the
(Ai, IDi) to all OBUs and each OBU adds the IDi into his local revocation list (RL).
5. Using the taxonomies
In designing the above taxonomies, we selected those components and approach of existing
mechanisms that, in our opinion, offer critical information regarding design philosophy and
security properties. How can these taxonomies be used?
• A map of anonymous authentication protocols for VANETs. For novice researchers, these
taxonomies offer a comprehensive overview for a quick introduction to this field.
Experienced researchers can use and extend these taxonomies to structure and organize
their knowledge in the field.
• Exploring new strategies. Besides the existing mechanisms, the taxonomy explored a few
strategies seen rarely in the wild and some novel methods.
• Understanding solution constrains. The taxonomy highlights common constraints and
weaknesses for each class of mechanisms. Understanding these problems will focus
research efforts on solving them.
• Identifying unexplored research areas. Examining the effectiveness of different mechanism
classes achieving different security properties will highlight unexplored venues for
research.
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6. Conclusion
The anonymous authentication protocols for VANETs can be constructed based on amultitude
of cryptographic primitives, which obscures a global view of this field. This chapter is an
attempt to cut through the obscurity and structure the knowledge in this field. The proposed
taxonomies are intended to help the community think about the constrains of existing works
and the possible countermeasures.
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8. Nomenclature
Notations Descriptions
TA: Trusted Authority
OBU: OnBoard Unit
RSU: RoadSide Unit
VANETs: Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
DSRC: Dedicated Short Range Communications
V2V: Vehicle-to-Vehicle
IVC: Inter-Vehicle Communication
FCC: Federal Communications Commission
ETSI: European Telecommunications Standards Institute
VSC: Vehicle Safety Communications
DoS: Denial of service
TESLA: Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication
MAC: Message Authentication Code
CRL: Certificate Revocation List
TSVC: Time-efficient and Secure Vehicular Communication
Table 3. Notations
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discusses some of the critical security challenges faced by today's computing world and provides insights to
possible mechanisms to defend against these attacks. The book contains sixteen chapters which deal with
security and privacy issues in computing and communication networks, quantum cryptography and the
evolutionary concepts of cryptography and their applications like chaos-based cryptography and DNA
cryptography. It will be useful for researchers, engineers, graduate and doctoral students working in
cryptography and security related areas. It will also be useful for faculty members of graduate schools and
universities.
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